72 ideas
10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
23000 | Vicious regresses force you to another level; non-vicious imply another level [Baron/Miller] |
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
23445 | Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
23447 | In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo] |
23443 | The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo] |
23444 | To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo] |
23024 | A traveller takes a copy of a picture into the past, gives it the artist, who then creates the original! [Baron/Miller] |
23446 | You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo] |
23448 | Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo] |
14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
23441 | Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo] |
23442 | Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo] |
23008 | Grounding is intended as a relation that fits dependences between things [Baron/Miller] |
14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
23018 | How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time? [Baron/Miller] |
10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
536 | We should follow the law in public, and nature in private [Antiphon] |
1557 | To gain the greatest advantage only treat law as important when other people are present [Antiphon] |
540 | The way you spend your time will form your character [Antiphon] |
539 | Nothing is worse for mankind than anarchy [Antiphon] |
23011 | Modern accounts of causation involve either processes or counterfactuals [Baron/Miller] |
23013 | The main process theory of causation says it is transference of mass, energy, momentum or charge [Baron/Miller] |
23014 | If causes are processes, what is causation by omission? (Distinguish legal from scientific causes?) [Baron/Miller] |
23015 | The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are [Baron/Miller] |
23016 | Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system [Baron/Miller] |
23009 | There is no second 'law' of thermodynamics; it just reflects probabilities of certain microstates [Baron/Miller] |
23002 | In relativity space and time depend on one's motion, but spacetime gives an invariant metric [Baron/Miller] |
22988 | The block universe theory says entities of all times exist, and time is the B-series [Baron/Miller] |
22991 | How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real? [Baron/Miller] |
22992 | If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing [Baron/Miller] |
22994 | Erzatz Presentism allows the existence of other times, with only the present 'actualised' [Baron/Miller] |
22998 | How do presentists explain relations between things existing at different times? [Baron/Miller] |
23017 | Presentism needs endurantism, because other theories imply most of the object doesn't exist [Baron/Miller] |
23023 | How can presentists move to the next future moment, if that doesn't exist? [Baron/Miller] |
22995 | Most of the sciences depend on the concept of time [Baron/Miller] |
22993 | For abstractionists past times might still exist, althought their objects don't [Baron/Miller] |
23001 | The error theory of time's passage says it is either a misdescription or a false inference [Baron/Miller] |
22999 | It is meaningless to measure the rate of time using time itself, and without a rate there is no flow [Baron/Miller] |
22986 | The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction [Baron/Miller] |
22996 | The A-series has to treat being past, present or future as properties [Baron/Miller] |
23007 | The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow [Baron/Miller] |
23003 | Static theories cannot account for time's obvious asymmetry, so time must be dynamic [Baron/Miller] |
23004 | The direction of time is either primitive, or reducible to something else [Baron/Miller] |
23005 | The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature [Baron/Miller] |
23006 | Maybe the past is just the direction of decreasing entropy [Baron/Miller] |
23010 | We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects [Baron/Miller] |
22989 | Static time theory presents change as one property at t1, and a different property at t2 [Baron/Miller] |
23020 | If a time traveller kills his youthful grandfather, he both exists and fails to exist [Baron/Miller] |
23022 | Presentism means there no existing past for a time traveller to visit [Baron/Miller] |
22987 | The past (unlike the future) is fixed, along with truths about it, by the existence of past objects [Baron/Miller] |
22990 | The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future [Baron/Miller] |
22997 | The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property [Baron/Miller] |