41 ideas
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
12268 | Contradiction is impossible [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle] |
602 | Some fools think you cannot define anything, but only say what it is like [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle] |
16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
13074 | Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
1664 | I would rather go mad than experience pleasure [Antisthenes (I)] |
21385 | Antisthenes said virtue is teachable and permanent, is life's goal, and is like universal wealth [Antisthenes (I), by Long] |
7563 | The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley] |
2631 | Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature [Antisthenes (I), by Cicero] |
16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |