174 ideas
2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
12268 | Contradiction is impossible [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle] |
3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
602 | Some fools think you cannot define anything, but only say what it is like [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle] |
4779 | For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos] |
10369 | How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J] |
8976 | If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim] |
8975 | Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons] |
8974 | Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons] |
8977 | Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim] |
8980 | Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim] |
2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
3536 | Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim] |
2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
13745 | Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence [Kim] |
13746 | Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation [Kim] |
3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
15456 | Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis] |
3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
8825 | It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim] |
530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
14470 | Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim] |
3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
18658 | The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka] |
3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |
1664 | I would rather go mad than experience pleasure [Antisthenes (I)] |
18664 | Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka] |
21385 | Antisthenes said virtue is teachable and permanent, is life's goal, and is like universal wealth [Antisthenes (I), by Long] |
18624 | Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka] |
18626 | One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka] |
18627 | A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka] |
18625 | To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka] |
18638 | The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka] |
23418 | Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka] |
18635 | Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka] |
23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
23414 | Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka] |
18630 | Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka] |
18623 | The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka] |
18628 | We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka] |
18629 | Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka] |
18637 | Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka] |
23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
18663 | Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka] |
23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
18632 | Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka] |
22818 | Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka] |
23410 | Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka] |
23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
18656 | Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka] |
23409 | Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka] |
18659 | The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka] |
18660 | Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka] |
23419 | Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka] |
18657 | Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka] |
23413 | Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka] |
23415 | Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka] |
18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
23411 | Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka] |
23412 | Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka] |
23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
3535 | All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim] |
3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
2631 | Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature [Antisthenes (I), by Cicero] |