Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Antonio Gramsci, Thomas Grundmann and Francesco Orsi

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28 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19718 Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19717 Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
19716 Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
19715 You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
19713 Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
19714 Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
20937 The state should produce higher civilisations for all, in tune with the economic apparatus [Gramsci]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
20935 Eventually political parties lose touch with the class they represent, which is dangerous [Gramsci]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
20936 Caesarism emerges when two forces in society are paralysed in conflict [Gramsci]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
20941 Totalitarian parties cut their members off from other cultural organisations [Gramsci]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
20939 What is the function of a parliament? Does it even constitute a part of the State structure? [Gramsci]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
20938 Liberalism's weakness is its powerful rigid bureaucracy [Gramsci]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
20940 Perfect political equality requires economic equality [Gramsci]