105 ideas
19023 | Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter] |
19033 | Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter] |
19032 | S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter] |
19036 | The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter] |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
19034 | The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter] |
19015 | Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter] |
19012 | The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter] |
19024 | A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
19021 | I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter] |
19016 | We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter] |
19017 | Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter] |
19014 | How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
19030 | Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter] |
19040 | We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter] |
19008 | The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter] |
19029 | It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
19028 | Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter] |
19010 | All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter] |
19013 | Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter] |
19019 | Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter] |
19022 | Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter] |
23705 | A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
19009 | Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter] |
19027 | Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter] |
19025 | Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter] |
19031 | There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |
19037 | Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter] |
19018 | Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter] |
19020 | Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter] |
18658 | The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka] |
18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |
18664 | Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka] |
18624 | Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka] |
18626 | One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka] |
18627 | A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka] |
18625 | To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka] |
18638 | The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka] |
23418 | Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka] |
18635 | Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka] |
23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
23414 | Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka] |
18630 | Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka] |
18623 | The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka] |
18628 | We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka] |
18629 | Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka] |
18637 | Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka] |
23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
18663 | Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka] |
23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
18632 | Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka] |
22818 | Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka] |
23410 | Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka] |
23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
18656 | Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka] |
23409 | Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka] |
18659 | The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka] |
18660 | Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka] |
23419 | Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka] |
18657 | Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka] |
23413 | Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka] |
23415 | Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka] |
18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
23411 | Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka] |
23412 | Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka] |
23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |
19038 | Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter] |
17993 | Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain [Vetter] |
19026 | If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter] |
19041 | Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter] |