23 ideas
19504 | My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D] |
18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
19503 | An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D] |
19505 | Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG] |
19499 | We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D] |
19500 | Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D] |
19502 | Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D] |
19498 | Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D] |
19506 | Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D] |
19496 | Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D] |
19497 | Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D] |
19495 | Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D] |
19501 | We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D] |
19507 | Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D] |