102 ideas
3240 | There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel] |
13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
3242 | Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel] |
3241 | It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel] |
1489 | Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel] |
3248 | Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel] |
20989 | Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel] |
22354 | Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
3291 | Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels [Nagel] |
9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
12189 | Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge] |
3249 | Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel] |
22429 | We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel] |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel] |
3271 | We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel] |
3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
3252 | Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel] |
1490 | You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel] |
3251 | Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel] |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
2957 | Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood] |
3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel] |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel] |
3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel] |
3246 | I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel] |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |
13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
4001 | The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel] |
7320 | Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A] |
13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |
3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel] |
3265 | We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel] |
3263 | If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel] |
3256 | Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel] |
3272 | Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel] |
6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel] |
6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel] |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel] |
3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel] |
6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel] |
3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel] |
3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |
3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel] |
6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel] |
3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel] |
6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel] |
3290 | Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel] |