20 ideas
| 8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
| 13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
| 22076 | Being is only perceptible to itself as becoming [Schelling] |
| 22072 | Schelling always affirmed the absolute status of freedom [Schelling, by Courtine] |
| 21925 | For Schelling the Absolute spirit manifests as nature in which self-consciousness evolves [Schelling, by Lewis,PB] |
| 22045 | Metaphysics aims at the Absolute, which goes beyond subjective and objective viewpoints [Schelling, by Pinkard] |
| 22074 | We must show that the whole of nature, because it is effective, is grounded in freedom [Schelling] |
| 22073 | The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling] |
| 22075 | Only idealism has given us the genuine concept of freedom [Schelling] |
| 20956 | Ultimately, all being is willing. The nature of primal being is the same as the nature of willing [Schelling] |
| 20957 | We don't choose our characters, yet we still claim credit for the actions our characters perform [Schelling] |
| 22057 | Schelling sought a union between the productivities of nature and of the mind [Schelling, by Bowie] |
| 22031 | Schelling made organisms central to nature, because mere mechanism could never produce them [Schelling, by Pinkard] |
| 8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
| 8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
| 8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
| 8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
| 8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
| 8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
| 8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |