14 ideas
21960 | Ordinary language is the beginning of philosophy, but there is much more to it [Austin,JL] |
19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
10835 | True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion [Austin,JL] |
10836 | Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map [Austin,JL] |
19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
21598 | Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson] |
19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |