Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Archimedes, Martin Heidegger and Peter Smith

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92 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide [Heidegger]
Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Perhaps the aim of philosophy is to abolish sham problems [Heidegger]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo]
Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P]
Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P]
A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P]
A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P]
An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P]
A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P]
A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P]
Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P]
A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P]
'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P]
A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P]
A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P]
Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P]
A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P]
A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P]
The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P]
The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 9. Expressibility
Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P]
The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / b. Baby arithmetic
Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P]
Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / c. Robinson arithmetic
Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P]
Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P]
Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May]
For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray]
Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger]
Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger]
In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger]
'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger]
The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger]
I say the manifestation of Being needs humans, and humans only exist as reflected in Being [Heidegger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo]
If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
My active existence is defined by being able to say 'I can' [Heidegger]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
Certainty that I will die is more basic to my existence than the Cogito [Heidegger]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger]
Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Culture is now dominated by boredom, so universal it is unnoticed [Heidegger, by Aho]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley]
Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be [Heidegger]