31 ideas
18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
6230 | If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth] |
6228 | Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth] |
6229 | Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth] |
6227 | Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth] |
6231 | There is a self-determing power in each person, which makes them what they are [Cudworth] |
6225 | Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth] |
6224 | An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth] |
6223 | If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth] |
6226 | The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth] |