Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Archimedes, William James and E.J. Lemmon

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100 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
A single explanation must have a single point of view [James]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James]
New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James]
If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
'Contradictory' propositions always differ in truth-value [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
We write the conditional 'if P (antecedent) then Q (consequent)' as P→Q [Lemmon]
That proposition that either P or Q is their 'disjunction', written P∨Q [Lemmon]
That proposition that both P and Q is their 'conjunction', written P∧Q [Lemmon]
The sign |- may be read as 'therefore' [Lemmon]
We write the 'negation' of P (not-P) as ¬ [Lemmon]
We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q; it is also P iff Q, or (P→Q)∧(Q→P) [Lemmon]
If A and B are 'interderivable' from one another we may write A -||- B [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
A 'well-formed formula' follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔ [Lemmon]
A wff is a 'tautology' if all assignments to variables result in the value T [Lemmon]
A 'theorem' is the conclusion of a provable sequent with zero assumptions [Lemmon]
A 'substitution-instance' is a wff formed by consistent replacing variables with wffs [Lemmon]
A wff is 'inconsistent' if all assignments to variables result in the value F [Lemmon]
'Contrary' propositions are never both true, so that ¬(A∧B) is a tautology [Lemmon]
Two propositions are 'equivalent' if they mirror one another's truth-value [Lemmon]
A wff is 'contingent' if produces at least one T and at least one F [Lemmon]
'Subcontrary' propositions are never both false, so that A∨B is a tautology [Lemmon]
The 'scope' of a connective is the connective, the linked formulae, and the brackets [Lemmon]
A 'implies' B if B is true whenever A is true (so that A→B is tautologous) [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
DN: Given A, we may derive ¬¬A [Lemmon]
A: we may assume any proposition at any stage [Lemmon]
∧E: Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately [Lemmon]
∧I: Given A and B, we may derive A∧B [Lemmon]
CP: Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B [Lemmon]
MPP: Given A and A→B, we may derive B [Lemmon]
∨E: Derive C from A∨B, if C can be derived both from A and from B [Lemmon]
RAA: If assuming A will prove B∧¬B, then derive ¬A [Lemmon]
MTT: Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A [Lemmon]
∨I: Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q [Lemmon]
'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q [Lemmon]
We can change conditionals into negated conjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) [Lemmon]
We can change conditionals into disjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q [Lemmon]
De Morgan's Laws make negated conjunctions/disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions/conjunctions [Lemmon]
The Distributive Laws can rearrange a pair of conjunctions or disjunctions [Lemmon]
We can change conjunctions into negated conditionals with P→Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth-tables are good for showing invalidity [Lemmon]
A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, but this won't work for more complex logic [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
If any of the nine rules of propositional logic are applied to tautologies, the result is a tautology [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 5. Completeness of PL
Propositional logic is complete, since all of its tautologous sequents are derivable [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
Write '(∀x)(...)' to mean 'take any x: then...', and '(∃x)(...)' to mean 'there is an x such that....' [Lemmon]
'Gm' says m has property G, and 'Pmn' says m has relation P to n [Lemmon]
The 'symbols' are bracket, connective, term, variable, predicate letter, reverse-E [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / b. Terminology of PC
Our notation uses 'predicate-letters' (for 'properties'), 'variables', 'proper names', 'connectives' and 'quantifiers' [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
Universal Elimination (UE) lets us infer that an object has F, from all things having F [Lemmon]
With finite named objects, we can generalise with &-Intro, but otherwise we need ∀-Intro [Lemmon]
UE all-to-one; UI one-to-all; EI arbitrary-to-one; EE proof-to-one [Lemmon]
Predicate logic uses propositional connectives and variables, plus new introduction and elimination rules [Lemmon]
Universal elimination if you start with the universal, introduction if you want to end with it [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
If there is a finite domain and all objects have names, complex conjunctions can replace universal quantifiers [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
'Some Frenchmen are generous' is rendered by (∃x)(Fx→Gx), and not with the conditional → [Lemmon]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
The paradoxes of material implication are P |- Q → P, and ¬P |- P → Q [Lemmon]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James]
Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Imagine millions made happy on condition that one person suffers endless lonely torture [James]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James]
Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / d. Religious Experience
Private experience is the main evidence for God [James]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James]