71 ideas
4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
16676 | Why use more things when fewer will do? [William of Ockham] |
6806 | Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham] |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
16608 | Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
16654 | Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham] |
18529 | Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham] |
14933 | Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross] |
17996 | Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos] |
22132 | Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham] |
9103 | A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham] |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
16779 | Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham] |
16757 | Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham] |
16599 | Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
16681 | Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham] |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
16792 | If parts change, the whole changes [William of Ockham] |
9089 | Knowledge is a quality existing subjectively in the soul [William of Ockham] |
9091 | Sometimes 'knowledge' just concerns the conclusion, sometimes the whole demonstration [William of Ockham] |
9100 | Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true [William of Ockham] |
9090 | Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true [William of Ockham] |
4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
9101 | Abstractive cognition knows universals abstracted from many singulars [William of Ockham] |
9102 | If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham] |
4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
9114 | There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham] |
9104 | A universal is the result of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing [William of Ockham] |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
16675 | Every extended material substance is composed of parts distant from one another [William of Ockham] |
4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |
19381 | The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham] |
9111 | God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham] |
8010 | William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham] |
9112 | We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham] |
9115 | To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham] |
16679 | Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |