28 ideas
12104 | All ideas must be understood historically [Comte] |
12105 | Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte] |
12112 | Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte] |
12106 | Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte] |
7491 | The phases of human thought are theological, then metaphysical, then positivist [Comte, by Watson] |
12111 | Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte] |
12114 | Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte] |
12116 | Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte] |
2764 | Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J] |
19080 | Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
12108 | All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte] |
12109 | We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
12107 | Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte] |
12115 | Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte] |
12113 | The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte] |
12110 | We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte] |