30 ideas
| 4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
| 8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
| 4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
| 4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
| 4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
| 4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
| 4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
| 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
| 4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
| 4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
| 4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
| 4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
| 18085 | Values that approach zero, becoming less than any quantity, are 'infinitesimals' [Cauchy] |
| 18084 | When successive variable values approach a fixed value, that is its 'limit' [Cauchy] |
| 8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
| 4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
| 4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
| 4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
| 8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
| 4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
| 8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
| 8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
| 8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
| 8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
| 8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
| 4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
| 8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
| 4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |