Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Augustin-Louis Cauchy, Thomas S. Kuhn and Gregory L. Murphy

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35 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Values that approach zero, becoming less than any quantity, are 'infinitesimals' [Cauchy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
When successive variable values approach a fixed value, that is its 'limit' [Cauchy]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher]
Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn]
Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha]
Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn]
In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy]
The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy]
Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy]
Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy]
The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy]
Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy]
The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy]
The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy]
Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy]
Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy]
The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy]
Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy]
Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy]
Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy]
The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy]
Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy]
Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy]
People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy]