15 ideas
| 18085 | Values that approach zero, becoming less than any quantity, are 'infinitesimals' [Cauchy] |
| 18084 | When successive variable values approach a fixed value, that is its 'limit' [Cauchy] |
| 8526 | We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly] |
| 8527 | More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly] |
| 8528 | If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly] |
| 19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
| 19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
| 19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
| 19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
| 19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
| 19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
| 19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
| 19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
| 19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
| 19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |