14 ideas
| 11193 | Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence [Avicenna] |
| 11209 | The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna] |
| 11204 | The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna] |
| 15036 | An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio] |
| 19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
| 19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
| 19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
| 19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
| 19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
| 19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
| 19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
| 12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
| 12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
| 13440 | Causation is the power of one property to produce another, and this gives time its direction [Esfeld] |