Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina), Paul Boghossian and Carl Friedrich Gauss

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
11193 Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence [Avicenna]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
6345 Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
10855 Actual infinities are not allowed in mathematics - only limits which may increase without bound [Gauss]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
11209 The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
11204 The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
15036 An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]