61 ideas
| 12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
| 12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
| 12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
| 9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
| 12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
| 12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
| 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
| 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
| 8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
| 8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
| 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
| 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
| 8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| 8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
| 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
| 12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
| 12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
| 12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
| 15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
| 12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
| 15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
| 9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
| 18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
| 15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
| 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
| 12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
| 8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
| 12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
| 11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
| 12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
| 12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
| 13804 | A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G] |
| 13805 | Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G] |
| 12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
| 13808 | A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G] |
| 13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G] |
| 13807 | A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G] |
| 12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
| 12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
| 13809 | One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G] |
| 12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
| 11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
| 12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
| 13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
| 12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
| 12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
| 12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
| 12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
| 12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
| 12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
| 12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
| 12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
| 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
| 8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
| 12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
| 12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
| 12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |