63 ideas
23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
9406 | A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
15730 | Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
8520 | An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K] |
24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |