143 ideas
21916 | Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer] |
4171 | Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer] |
4186 | Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer] |
7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
12171 | Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer] |
21366 | Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
21474 | Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation [Schopenhauer] |
7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
21918 | Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
21470 | For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will [Schopenhauer] |
21926 | Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
4167 | The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
21920 | No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
21362 | Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
21479 | Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority [Schopenhauer] |
4165 | Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer] |
21361 | For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
21923 | Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer] |
4162 | The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer] |
21922 | We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer] |
21913 | Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer] |
21919 | Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
21476 | A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge [Schopenhauer] |
4164 | Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer] |
4163 | All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer] |
21473 | All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer] |
21917 | The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
4166 | A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer] |
21369 | We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer] |
21478 | Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises [Schopenhauer] |
4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
21367 | I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer] |
7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
4175 | It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer] |
4176 | We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer] |
21477 | We don't control our own thinking [Schopenhauer] |
4170 | Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer] |
21921 | Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21475 | All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
4169 | Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer] |
7187 | Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer] |
21365 | Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer] |
21924 | As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer] |
4173 | If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer] |
21363 | Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer] |
21372 | Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will [Schopenhauer] |
21370 | Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
4182 | A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer] |
21488 | The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will [Schopenhauer] |
21928 | The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21927 | Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
4174 | Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer] |
8116 | The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner] |
21380 | The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer] |
21374 | We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer] |
21378 | We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them [Schopenhauer] |
21375 | Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer] |
21915 | To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer] |
21483 | Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal [Schopenhauer] |
21379 | Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer] |
4181 | Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer] |
5649 | Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton] |
4177 | Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer] |
4185 | Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer] |
4183 | Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer] |
4172 | Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer] |
21371 | We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer] |
21466 | Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect [Schopenhauer] |
4184 | Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer] |
21484 | A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action [Schopenhauer] |
21481 | Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices [Schopenhauer] |
21482 | The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty [Schopenhauer] |
21480 | Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity [Schopenhauer] |
21469 | Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact [Schopenhauer] |
21485 | The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another [Schopenhauer] |
21486 | Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
21487 | The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness [Schopenhauer] |
21471 | If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now [Schopenhauer] |
21467 | Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable? [Schopenhauer] |
21376 | Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer] |
4179 | The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer] |
4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
4178 | Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer] |
4180 | Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer] |
21472 | Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people [Schopenhauer] |
21468 | The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible [Schopenhauer] |