80 ideas
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
10373 | Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
17306 | If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J] |
17304 | As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J] |
14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
10367 | There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
17308 | Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J] |
5517 | Individuals don't exist, but are conventional names for sets of elements [Buddha] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
17305 | I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J] |
10359 | In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J] |
10372 | Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J] |
10374 | There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J] |
17307 | Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J] |
10366 | Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J] |
10377 | Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J] |
10378 | A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J] |
10382 | Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J] |
10375 | At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J] |
10389 | Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J] |
10390 | Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J] |
10380 | Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J] |
10385 | If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
10388 | Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J] |
10387 | The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J] |
10384 | If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J] |
10386 | If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J] |
10361 | Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J] |
10360 | Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J] |
10362 | One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J] |
10368 | If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J] |
10383 | The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J] |
10393 | Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J] |
10394 | Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J] |
10376 | The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J] |
10381 | All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
7600 | The Buddha believed the gods would eventually disappear, and Nirvana was much higher [Buddha, by Armstrong,K] |
7601 | Life is suffering, from which only compassion, gentleness, truth and sobriety can save us [Buddha] |