38 ideas
23326 | In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M] |
23335 | In late antiquity nearly all philosophers were monotheists [Frede,M] |
16137 | Earlier views of Aristotle were dominated by 'Categories' [Frede,M] |
23249 | The early philosophers thought that reason has its own needs and desires [Frede,M] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
10197 | An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
16157 | Insurance on the original ship would hardly be paid out if the plank version was wrecked! [Frede,M] |
10198 | If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW] |
10199 | Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW] |
23334 | For Christians man has free will by creation in God's image (as in Genesis) [Frede,M] |
23333 | The idea of free will achieved universal acceptance because of Christianity [Frede,M] |
23337 | The Stoics needed free will, to allow human choices in a divinely providential cosmos [Frede,M] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
23336 | There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M] |
14610 | Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past [Zimmerman,DW] |
14608 | A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW] |
23313 | The Gnostic demiurge (creator) is deluded, and doesn't care about us [Frede,M] |