65 ideas
23948 | Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon] |
23942 | Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon] |
23945 | Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon] |
22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
5451 | Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner] |
23957 | We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon] |
22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
23943 | Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon] |
23952 | I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon] |
23954 | Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon] |
23960 | Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon] |
23961 | The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon] |
23965 | Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon] |
23959 | Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon] |
23936 | It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon] |
23963 | Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon] |
23946 | The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon] |
23940 | Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon] |
23949 | Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon] |
23956 | The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon] |
23953 | Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon] |
23964 | There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon] |
23937 | It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon] |
23947 | Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon] |
23958 | The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
23944 | Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon] |
23962 | Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon] |
23941 | 'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon] |
23955 | Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon] |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |