58 ideas
| 4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
| 12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
| 12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
| 4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
| 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
| 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
| 8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
| 8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
| 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
| 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
| 8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| 8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
| 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
| 12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
| 4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
| 12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
| 12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
| 14933 | Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross] |
| 18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
| 17996 | Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos] |
| 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
| 4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
| 4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
| 4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
| 4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
| 4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
| 4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
| 4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
| 4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
| 4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
| 4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
| 4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
| 4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
| 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
| 8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
| 12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
| 12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
| 12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
| 18555 | The beautiful is that from which nothing can be subtracted and to which nothing can be added [Alberti] |
| 4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
| 4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
| 4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
| 4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
| 4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
| 4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
| 4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
| 4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
| 4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
| 4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
| 4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
| 4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
| 4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
| 4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
| 4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
| 4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
| 4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |