50 ideas
4697 | There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady] |
4731 | Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady] |
4735 | Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
4703 | The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady] |
4701 | To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady] |
4705 | Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady] |
4700 | A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady] |
4704 | Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
4711 | Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady] |
4698 | What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
4715 | We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady] |
4719 | Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady] |
4720 | Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady] |
4722 | Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady] |
4724 | Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady] |
4723 | Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady] |
4709 | Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady] |
4725 | Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady] |
4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
4710 | Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
4717 | If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady] |
4706 | Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady] |
4734 | Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady] |
7276 | All art is quite useless [Wilde] |
7274 | Books are only well or badly written, not moral or immoral [Wilde] |
7275 | Having ethical sympathies is a bad mannerism of style in an artist [Wilde] |
4727 | The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady] |