Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Richard Breheny and T.H. Green

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright]
Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright]
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The good life aims at perfections, or absolute laws, or what is absolutely desirable [Green,TH]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
States only have full authority if they heed the claims of human fellowship [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH]
Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
People are improved by egalitarian institutions and habits [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Equality also implies liberty, because equality must be of opportunity as well as possessions [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
All talk of the progress of a nation must reduce to the progress of its individual members [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
The highest political efforts express our deeper social spirit [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Communism is wrong because it restricts the freedom of individuals to contribute to the community [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
Original common ownership is securing private property, not denying it [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
National spirit only exists in the individuals who embody it [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
The ground of property ownership is not force but the power to use it for social ends [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
Property is needed by all citizens, to empower them to achieve social goods [Green,TH]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
By 'force' I mean the sources of all actions - sometimes called 'powers' by their outcomes [Breheny]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH]