Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Thomas Mautner and Stephen Yablo

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86 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them [Mautner]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 9. Recursive Definition
Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes [Mautner]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole [Mautner]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree [Mautner]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q [Mautner]
A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright]
Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo]
Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo]
Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo]
'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo]
We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo]
Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume [Mautner]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [Mautner, by PG]
If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo]
Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright]
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance [Mautner]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner]
Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature [Mautner]