48 ideas
| 7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P] |
| 7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P] |
| 7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P] |
| 12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
| 10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P] |
| 10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P] |
| 10844 | The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P] |
| 10841 | The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P] |
| 8358 | There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P] |
| 12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
| 6413 | 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling] |
| 8354 | Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P] |
| 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
| 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
| 8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
| 8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
| 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
| 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
| 8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| 8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
| 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
| 12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
| 12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
| 12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
| 18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
| 16980 | We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P] |
| 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
| 16979 | It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P] |
| 9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
| 9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P] |
| 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
| 8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
| 12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
| 12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
| 8356 | The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P] |
| 10430 | Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury] |
| 12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
| 10448 | If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P] |
| 8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P] |
| 8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P] |
| 9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P] |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
| 21275 | Unlike a stone, the parts of a watch are obviously assembled in order to show the time [Paley] |
| 21276 | From the obvious purpose and structure of a watch we must infer that it was designed [Paley] |
| 21277 | Even an imperfect machine can exhibit obvious design [Paley] |
| 21278 | All the signs of design found in a watch are also found in nature [Paley] |
| 21357 | No organ shows purpose more obviously than the eyelid [Paley] |