69 ideas
| 20981 | What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen] |
| 20982 | In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen] |
| 23000 | Vicious regresses force you to another level; non-vicious imply another level [Baron/Miller] |
| 19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 23024 | A traveller takes a copy of a picture into the past, gives it the artist, who then creates the original! [Baron/Miller] |
| 23008 | Grounding is intended as a relation that fits dependences between things [Baron/Miller] |
| 19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 23018 | How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time? [Baron/Miller] |
| 20990 | Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen] |
| 21005 | A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen] |
| 20983 | The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen] |
| 20987 | The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen] |
| 20984 | A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen] |
| 20986 | A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen] |
| 21001 | Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen] |
| 21002 | Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen] |
| 20979 | Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen] |
| 20999 | Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen] |
| 20993 | Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen] |
| 20995 | Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen] |
| 20998 | Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen] |
| 20997 | The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen] |
| 20996 | All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen] |
| 20988 | Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen] |
| 21000 | If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen] |
| 20980 | You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen] |
| 20978 | Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen] |
| 20985 | Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen] |
| 20994 | We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen] |
| 23011 | Modern accounts of causation involve either processes or counterfactuals [Baron/Miller] |
| 23013 | The main process theory of causation says it is transference of mass, energy, momentum or charge [Baron/Miller] |
| 23014 | If causes are processes, what is causation by omission? (Distinguish legal from scientific causes?) [Baron/Miller] |
| 23015 | The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are [Baron/Miller] |
| 23016 | Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system [Baron/Miller] |
| 23009 | There is no second 'law' of thermodynamics; it just reflects probabilities of certain microstates [Baron/Miller] |
| 23002 | In relativity space and time depend on one's motion, but spacetime gives an invariant metric [Baron/Miller] |
| 22988 | The block universe theory says entities of all times exist, and time is the B-series [Baron/Miller] |
| 22991 | How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real? [Baron/Miller] |
| 22992 | If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing [Baron/Miller] |
| 22994 | Erzatz Presentism allows the existence of other times, with only the present 'actualised' [Baron/Miller] |
| 22998 | How do presentists explain relations between things existing at different times? [Baron/Miller] |
| 23017 | Presentism needs endurantism, because other theories imply most of the object doesn't exist [Baron/Miller] |
| 23023 | How can presentists move to the next future moment, if that doesn't exist? [Baron/Miller] |
| 22995 | Most of the sciences depend on the concept of time [Baron/Miller] |
| 22993 | For abstractionists past times might still exist, althought their objects don't [Baron/Miller] |
| 23001 | The error theory of time's passage says it is either a misdescription or a false inference [Baron/Miller] |
| 22999 | It is meaningless to measure the rate of time using time itself, and without a rate there is no flow [Baron/Miller] |
| 22986 | The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction [Baron/Miller] |
| 22996 | The A-series has to treat being past, present or future as properties [Baron/Miller] |
| 23007 | The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow [Baron/Miller] |
| 23003 | Static theories cannot account for time's obvious asymmetry, so time must be dynamic [Baron/Miller] |
| 23004 | The direction of time is either primitive, or reducible to something else [Baron/Miller] |
| 23005 | The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature [Baron/Miller] |
| 23006 | Maybe the past is just the direction of decreasing entropy [Baron/Miller] |
| 23010 | We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects [Baron/Miller] |
| 22989 | Static time theory presents change as one property at t1, and a different property at t2 [Baron/Miller] |
| 23020 | If a time traveller kills his youthful grandfather, he both exists and fails to exist [Baron/Miller] |
| 23022 | Presentism means there no existing past for a time traveller to visit [Baron/Miller] |
| 22987 | The past (unlike the future) is fixed, along with truths about it, by the existence of past objects [Baron/Miller] |
| 22990 | The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future [Baron/Miller] |
| 22997 | The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property [Baron/Miller] |