38 ideas
18915 | If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen] |
18919 | There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen] |
18913 | Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen] |
18907 | Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen] |
18912 | Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen] |
18922 | Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen] |
18905 | Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen] |
18908 | Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen] |
18917 | Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen] |
22180 | Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha] |
18916 | Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen] |
18921 | Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen] |
12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
22177 | Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha] |
22172 | Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha] |
22174 | The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha] |
22175 | Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha] |
22182 | Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha] |
22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |
22176 | Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha] |
22178 | If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha] |
18918 | Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen] |
18920 | 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen] |
18906 | Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen] |
22173 | Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha] |
17366 | Virtually all modern views of speciation rest on relational rather than intrinsic features [Okasha] |