42 ideas
| 12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
| 12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
| 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
| 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
| 8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
| 8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
| 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
| 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
| 8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| 8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
| 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
| 12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
| 12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
| 12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
| 18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
| 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
| 4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C] |
| 4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C] |
| 4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C] |
| 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
| 8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
| 12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
| 12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
| 12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
| 4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C] |
| 4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C] |
| 4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C] |
| 4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C] |
| 4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C] |
| 22809 | The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C] |
| 22595 | Liberty is the triumph of the individual, over both despotic government and enslaving majorities [Constant] |
| 22597 | Minority rights are everyone's rights, because we all have turns in the minority [Constant] |
| 22811 | Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C] |
| 22815 | If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C] |
| 22814 | Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C] |
| 22812 | For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C] |
| 22810 | A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C] |
| 22813 | Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C] |
| 23417 | If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka] |
| 4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C] |