97 ideas
21970 | Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte] |
21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
16415 | Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber] |
16413 | Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber] |
21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
6912 | For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach] |
23247 | The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte] |
23232 | Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte] |
21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
10001 | An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber] |
21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
16416 | The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber] |
21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
10007 | Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
10002 | '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber] |
21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
9998 | What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber] |
21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
10003 | Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber] |
10008 | Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber] |
10005 | Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber] |
10000 | We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber] |
21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
10006 | First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber] |
21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
23227 | Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
23228 | The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte] |
21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22062 | Mental presentation are not empirical, but concern the strivings of the self [Fichte] |
22015 | The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
21973 | Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW] |
21914 | We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte] |
23241 | I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
20951 | The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie] |
21964 | Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte] |
21968 | Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte] |
21966 | Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte] |
21967 | There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte] |
21969 | Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte] |
23231 | I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte] |
23246 | Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte] |
23245 | Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte] |
23242 | Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
23240 | We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte] |
10004 | Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
23243 | Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
22063 | Effective individuals must posit a specific material body for themselves [Fichte] |
23244 | Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte] |
23237 | The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte] |
23235 | I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte] |
21965 | Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte] |
23230 | Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
23233 | The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte] |
23234 | I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte] |
23239 | The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
23238 | If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte] |
23236 | Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte] |
22595 | Liberty is the triumph of the individual, over both despotic government and enslaving majorities [Constant] |
22597 | Minority rights are everyone's rights, because we all have turns in the minority [Constant] |
23229 | Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |