Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Benjamin Constant, Thomas Hofweber and John Kekes

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114 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber]
'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber]
'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber]
If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber]
The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
'2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber]
Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber]
The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber]
What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber]
'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes]
Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes]
Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes]
Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes]
Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes]
Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes]
Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes]
Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes]
Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes]
The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes]
Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Liberty is the triumph of the individual, over both despotic government and enslaving majorities [Constant]
The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes]
Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Minority rights are everyone's rights, because we all have turns in the minority [Constant]
Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes]
Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes]
Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes]
Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes]
It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes]
The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes]
Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes]