47 ideas
| 9307 | Modern Western culture suddenly appeared in Jena in the 1790s [Svendsen] |
| 9297 | You can't understand love in terms of 'if and only if...' [Svendsen] |
| 3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
| 3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
| 3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
| 3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
| 3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
| 3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
| 3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
| 9308 | If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen] |
| 3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
| 3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| 8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| 8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
| 8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
| 3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
| 3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
| 3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| 3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
| 3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
| 3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
| 3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
| 3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
| 3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
| 3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
| 3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
| 8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
| 3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
| 3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| 9309 | Emotions have intentional objects, while a mood is objectless [Svendsen] |
| 3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
| 9304 | Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived [Svendsen] |
| 20721 | Punctuality and justice in dealings are excellent for raising a man in the world [Franklin] |
| 9310 | The profoundest boredom is boredom with boredom [Svendsen] |
| 9302 | We are bored because everything comes to us fully encoded, and we want personal meaning [Svendsen] |
| 9298 | We can be unaware that we are bored [Svendsen] |
| 9301 | Boredom is so radical that suicide could not overcome it; only never having existed would do it [Svendsen] |
| 9311 | We have achieved a sort of utopia, and it is boring, so that is the end of utopias [Svendsen] |
| 9303 | The concept of 'alienation' seems no longer applicable [Svendsen] |
| 20720 | Time is money, ..credit is money, ..and money breeds more money [Franklin] |