Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Bernard Williams, Anon (Upan) and M.R. Ayers

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98 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B]
It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
Self is the rider, intellect the charioteer, mind the reins, and body the chariot [Anon (Upan)]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We have an apparent and a true self; only the second one exists, and we must seek to know it [Anon (Upan)]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Without speech we cannot know right/wrong, true/false, good/bad, or pleasant/unpleasant [Anon (Upan)]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]
The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
The wise prefer good to pleasure; the foolish are drawn to pleasure by desire [Anon (Upan)]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B]
"Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B]
The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B]
Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B]
Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B]
Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Let your teacher be a god to you [Anon (Upan)]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
By knowing one piece of clay or gold, you know all of clay or gold [Anon (Upan)]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Originally there must have been just Existence, which could not come from non-existence [Anon (Upan)]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
Brahma, supreme god and protector of the universe, arose from the ocean of existence [Anon (Upan)]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
Brahman is the Uncaused Cause [Anon (Upan)]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Earth, food, fire, sun are all forms of Brahman [Anon (Upan)]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Damayata - be self-controlled! Datta - be charitable! Dayadhwam - be compassionate! [Anon (Upan)]
The gods are not worshipped for their own sake, but for the sake of the Self [Anon (Upan)]
A man with desires is continually reborn, until his desires are stilled [Anon (Upan)]
Those ignorant of Atman return as animals or plants, according to their merits [Anon (Upan)]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Charity and ritual observance distract from the highest good of religion [Anon (Upan)]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Do not seek to know Brahman by arguments, for arguments are idle and vain [Anon (Upan)]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The immortal in us is the part that never sleeps, and shapes our dreams [Anon (Upan)]
The immortal Self and the sad individual self are like two golden birds perched on one tree [Anon (Upan)]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]