Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Bernard Williams, Johann Gottfried Herder and Penelope Maddy

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126 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Thoughts are learnt through words, so language shows the limits and shape of our knowledge [Herder]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
'Forcing' can produce new models of ZFC from old models [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
A Large Cardinal Axiom would assert ever-increasing stages in the hierarchy [Maddy]
New axioms are being sought, to determine the size of the continuum [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
The Axiom of Extensionality seems to be analytic [Maddy]
Extensional sets are clearer, simpler, unique and expressive [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
The Axiom of Infinity states Cantor's breakthrough that launched modern mathematics [Maddy]
Infinite sets are essential for giving an account of the real numbers [Maddy]
Axiom of Infinity: completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
The Power Set Axiom is needed for, and supported by, accounts of the continuum [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
The Axiom of Foundation says every set exists at a level in the set hierarchy [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice have failed [Maddy]
Modern views say the Choice set exists, even if it can't be constructed [Maddy]
A large array of theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice [Maddy]
The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Axiom of Reducibility: propositional functions are extensionally predicative [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size is a vague intuition that over-large sets may generate paradoxes [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy]
Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Henkin semantics is more plausible for plural logic than for second-order logic [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Propositional functions' are propositions with a variable as subject or predicate [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy]
If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Completed infinities resulted from giving foundations to calculus [Maddy]
Cantor and Dedekind brought completed infinities into mathematics [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
Infinity has degrees, and large cardinals are the heart of set theory [Maddy]
For any cardinal there is always a larger one (so there is no set of all sets) [Maddy]
An 'inaccessible' cardinal cannot be reached by union sets or power sets [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
Theorems about limits could only be proved once the real numbers were understood [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
The extension of concepts is not important to me [Maddy]
In the ZFC hierarchy it is impossible to form Frege's set of all three-element sets [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Frege solves the Caesar problem by explicitly defining each number [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy]
Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy]
Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy]
A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver]
Making set theory foundational to mathematics leads to very fruitful axioms [Maddy]
Unified set theory gives a final court of appeal for mathematics [Maddy]
Set theory brings mathematics into one arena, where interrelations become clearer [Maddy]
Identifying geometric points with real numbers revealed the power of set theory [Maddy]
The line of rationals has gaps, but set theory provided an ordered continuum [Maddy]
Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy]
Mathematics rests on the logic of proofs, and on the set theoretic axioms [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy]
Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Scientists posit as few entities as possible, but set theorist posit as many as possible [Maddy]
Maybe applications of continuum mathematics are all idealisations [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
We can get arithmetic directly from HP; Law V was used to get HP from the definition of number [Maddy]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B]
Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Science idealises the earth's surface, the oceans, continuities, and liquids [Maddy]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Study the use of words, not their origins [Herder]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]
The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
We cannot attain all the ideals of every culture, so there cannot be a perfect life [Herder, by Berlin]
Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B]
Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B]
Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B]
"Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B]
The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]
For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B]
Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Herder invented the idea of being rooted in (or cut off from) a home or a group [Herder, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B]
Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]