121 ideas
15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
22355 | In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B] |
15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
23283 | Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B] |
2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
4244 | It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B] |
4243 | Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B] |
2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
3238 | 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B] |
3239 | You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B] |
7946 | The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C] |
2181 | It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B] |
2176 | There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B] |
2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
24008 | Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B] |
24009 | Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B] |
2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
4317 | We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham] |
9284 | Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B] |
2174 | Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B] |
22455 | Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B] |
4114 | Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B] |
22453 | Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot] |
22454 | We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot] |
22450 | If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot] |
2178 | In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B] |
20168 | Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B] |
20167 | Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B] |
4128 | Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B] |
4366 | We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse] |
4132 | The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B] |
24007 | Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B] |
4134 | The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B] |
4135 | Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B] |
22410 | Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B] |
22408 | Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B] |
22411 | For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B] |
4120 | It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B] |
23282 | If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B] |
4252 | Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B] |
4116 | A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B] |
2169 | Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B] |
4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
24010 | An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B] |
23279 | It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B] |
23280 | Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B] |
3236 | Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B] |
4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
4250 | The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B] |
4110 | Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B] |
4248 | Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B] |
4249 | "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B] |
2172 | The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B] |
4121 | Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B] |
22409 | We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B] |
4122 | If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B] |
2180 | If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B] |
24012 | Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B] |
2179 | If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B] |
22407 | Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B] |
23278 | For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B] |
4124 | Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B] |
4245 | Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B] |
4246 | Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B] |
3233 | Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B] |
3234 | Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B] |
3235 | It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B] |
4247 | It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B] |
4131 | Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B] |
4133 | Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B] |
2175 | There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B] |