17 ideas
13831 | Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz] |
13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
13823 | In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz] |
13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
23261 | A people, not government, creates a constitution, which is essential for legitimacy [Paine] |
14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |