16 ideas
| 16978 | If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko] |
| 12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
| 12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
| 14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
| 12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
| 14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
| 14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
| 16975 | Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko] |
| 14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
| 6668 | If the present does not exist, then consciousness must be memory of the immediate past [Marshall] |
| 14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
| 14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
| 14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
| 16976 | Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko] |
| 16977 | If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko] |
| 14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |