32 ideas
5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
6445 | You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose] |
19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |
12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |
14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |
1470 | Belief in an afterlife may be unverifiable in this life, but it will be verifiable after death [Hick, by PG] |
1471 | It may be hard to verify that we have become immortal, but we could still then verify religious claims [Hick, by PG] |
1469 | Some things (e.g. a section of the expansion of PI) can be verified but not falsified [Hick, by PG] |