53 ideas
| 4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
| 17536 | If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg] |
| 4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
| 17545 | Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg] |
| 17538 | Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg] |
| 4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
| 4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
| 4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
| 17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
| 4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
| 4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
| 4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
| 4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
| 4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
| 4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
| 4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
| 4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
| 4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
| 4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
| 4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
| 4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
| 4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
| 4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
| 4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
| 17553 | We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg] |
| 17544 | Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg] |
| 4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
| 17550 | We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg] |
| 12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
| 12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
| 14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
| 14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
| 12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
| 14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
| 6552 | You can only explain the qualities of large objects using entities which lack those qualities [Heisenberg] |
| 14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
| 4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
| 4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
| 14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
| 17549 | Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG] |
| 14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
| 14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
| 14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |
| 17540 | Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg] |
| 17541 | Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg] |
| 17548 | Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg] |
| 17533 | Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg] |
| 17537 | Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg] |
| 17551 | It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg] |
| 17532 | An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg] |
| 17543 | So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg] |
| 4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |
| 17552 | In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg] |