47 ideas
| 6602 | Philosophy is like a statue which is worshipped but never advances [Bacon] |
| 12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
| 12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
| 12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
| 12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
| 4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
| 4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
| 4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
| 4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
| 4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
| 4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
| 4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
| 4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
| 4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
| 4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
| 16639 | Only individual bodies exist [Bacon] |
| 16625 | In hylomorphism all the explanation of actions is in the form, and the matter doesn't do anything [Bacon] |
| 16033 | There are only individual bodies containing law-based powers, and the Forms are these laws [Bacon] |
| 4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
| 4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
| 4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
| 16724 | The senses deceive, but also show their own errors [Bacon] |
| 12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
| 3648 | Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both [Bacon] |
| 4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
| 4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
| 12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
| 6603 | Nature is revealed when we put it under pressure rather than observe it [Bacon] |
| 21950 | Science must clear away the idols of the mind if they are ever going to find the truth [Bacon] |
| 12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
| 12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
| 12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
| 14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
| 12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
| 14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
| 14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
| 14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
| 12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
| 4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
| 12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
| 14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
| 16624 | Stripped and passive matter is just a human invention [Bacon] |
| 14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
| 14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
| 12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |
| 14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |
| 7399 | Even without religion, there are many guides to morality [Bacon] |