Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Bert Leuridan, Timon and G.H. von Wright

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19 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan]
Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan]
We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan]
Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv]
We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv]
We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan]