36 ideas
22121 | The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22122 | Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
16660 | Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau] |
16648 | Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus] |
22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
15386 | If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
15387 | If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
16632 | We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus] |
22127 | Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
13094 | The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16650 | 'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus] |
16770 | It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus] |
16776 | Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus] |
16626 | Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus] |
16614 | Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus] |
10919 | What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus] |
22126 | Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
16768 | Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus] |
22129 | Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22130 | Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22128 | Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22131 | The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22687 | Maybe literary assessment is evaluating the artist as a suitable friend [Gaut] |
22686 | Formalists say aesthetics concerns types of beauty, or unity, complexity and intensity [Gaut] |
22690 | 'Moralism' says all aesthetic merits are moral merits [Gaut] |
22684 | Good ethics counts towards aesthetic merit, and bad ethics counts against it [Gaut] |
22689 | If we don't respond ethically in the way a work prescribes, that is an aesthetic failure [Gaut] |
22685 | Good art does not necessarily improve people (any more than good advice does) [Gaut] |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
22123 | The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
22124 | We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |