Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Berys Gaut, W Wimsatt/W Beardsley and Christine M. Korsgaard

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23 ideas

16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
9757 A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
9758 To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
9759 Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
22687 Maybe literary assessment is evaluating the artist as a suitable friend [Gaut]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
22686 Formalists say aesthetics concerns types of beauty, or unity, complexity and intensity [Gaut]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
20400 Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
7266 The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
7267 Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
7268 The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
7269 The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
7271 Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
22690 'Moralism' says all aesthetic merits are moral merits [Gaut]
22684 Good ethics counts towards aesthetic merit, and bad ethics counts against it [Gaut]
22689 If we don't respond ethically in the way a work prescribes, that is an aesthetic failure [Gaut]
22685 Good art does not necessarily improve people (any more than good advice does) [Gaut]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
18678 Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18225 If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
18228 An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
9760 Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
18224 Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
9761 Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
18233 Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
18226 For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]