Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Berys Gaut, Wilson,G/Schpall,S and Mozi

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25 ideas

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
22687 Maybe literary assessment is evaluating the artist as a suitable friend [Gaut]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
22686 Formalists say aesthetics concerns types of beauty, or unity, complexity and intensity [Gaut]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
22690 'Moralism' says all aesthetic merits are moral merits [Gaut]
22684 Good ethics counts towards aesthetic merit, and bad ethics counts against it [Gaut]
22689 If we don't respond ethically in the way a work prescribes, that is an aesthetic failure [Gaut]
22685 Good art does not necessarily improve people (any more than good advice does) [Gaut]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23395 Mohists desire wealth, population and social order as the best consequences [Mozi, by Norden]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
23394 If people regarded other states as they did their own, they would never attack them [Mozi]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
23396 Mozi condemns partiality, which is the cause of all the great harms in the world [Mozi]
23397 Those who are against impartiality still prefer impartial protectors [Mozi]