Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Blaise Pascal, Paul Bernays and Richard Cartwright

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing [Pascal]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The first principles of truth are not rational, but are known by the heart [Pascal]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
We only want to know things so that we can talk about them [Pascal]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
Painting makes us admire things of which we do not admire the originals [Pascal]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
It is a funny sort of justice whose limits are marked by a river [Pascal]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Imagination creates beauty, justice and happiness, which is the supreme good [Pascal]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We live for the past or future, and so are never happy in the present [Pascal]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
If man considers himself as lost and imprisoned in the universe, he will be terrified [Pascal]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Majority opinion is visible and authoritative, although not very clever [Pascal]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
It is not good to be too free [Pascal]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
Pascal knows you can't force belief, but you can make it much more probable [Pascal, by Hacking]
Pascal is right, but relies on the unsupported claim of a half as the chance of God's existence [Hacking on Pascal]
The libertine would lose a life of enjoyable sin if he chose the cloisters [Hacking on Pascal]
If you win the wager on God's existence you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing [Pascal]