Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Bonaventura, Achille Varzi and Karl Popper

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29 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]